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and held that "whether the sale or exchange of shares of stock gives
rise to ordinary as opposed to capital gain or loss depends upon
whether the taxpayer purchased and held the stock with a
predominant business motive as distinguished from a predominant
investment motive."4
Thus the IRS argued in Windle that the presence of any invest-
ment motive will destroy ordinary asset treatment while in the Rev-
enue Ruling the IRS contended that it is the predominant motive
which controls. The reaction of taxpayers is readily predictable.
Taxpayers seeking ordinary losses will go to the Court of Claims and
argue that their predominant motive was a business purpose under
the Revenue Ruling; taxpayers seeking capital gains will go to the
Tax Court and argue Windle, claiming that they had some
investment motive in the transaction.
Another ironic twist is that the IRS argued a position in Windle
which would make capital gains treatment seemingly easy to ob-
tain. It is difficult to conceive of a gain situation resulting from a
stock transaction where the taxpayer would be unable to establish
any investment motive.
The Windle decision has placed the IRS in an uncomfortable
corner. It is suggested that the IRS implore the taxpayer in Windle
to appeal the case so that the IRS can concede it.
RONALD B. RAVIKOFF
Accused's Silence During Custodial Interrogation
May Not Be Used to Impeach Credibility
Pursuant to Miranda, a defendant has a right to remain
silent during custodial interrogation. As a concomitant of that
right, a recent United States Supreme Court decision held that
a defendant's failure to offer exculpatory statements during
such an investigation may not be used in the subsequent trial
for the purpose of impeachment as a prior inconsistent state-
ment. The author criticizes the majority's failure to base its
decision on constitutional, rather than evidentiary grounds, as
this leaves the door open for future use of "silence" for other
purposes at trial.
42. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
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Defendant Hale was arrested for robbery in the District of Col-
umbia, taken to the police station, and advised of his right to re-
main silent. He was searched and found to be in possession of $158
in cash. Hale made no response when asked: "Where did you get the
money?" At trial, in federal district court, Hale took the stand,
asserted his innocence, and presented his alibi. The prosecutor, in
attempting to impeach Hale's explanation of his possession of the
money, caused Hale to admit on cross-examination that he had not
offered the exculpatory information at the time of police interroga-
tion. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the colloquoy
but refused to declare a mistrial. Hale was convicted. On appeal,
the court of appeals reversed, ' holding that inquiry into Hale's prior
silence impermissibly prejudiced his constitutional right to remain
silent2 under Miranda v. Arizona.3 On certiorari,4 the United States
Supreme Court held, affirmed: It is prejudicial error for a federal
court ' to permit cross-examination of a defendant concerning his
silence during police interrogation. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S.
171 (1975).
Though split, a majority of the courts which have dealt with the
same or similar issue have held that a defendant's silence prior to
trial cannot be brought out at trial.' Two circuits, however, have
1. United States v. Hale, 498 F.2d 1038 (D.C.Cir. 1974) (companion case to United
States v. Anderson). The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, applying Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), found as a matter of law that there was no inconsistency
between defendant's silence during police interrogation and his testimony at trial. The court
then stated that even if the silence had been inconsistent, Hale had actually exercised his
right to remain silent and that therefore his silence did not fall within Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971) and was directly protected by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
and the fifth amendment privilege not to be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. 498 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .. "See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Ullmann
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. Certiorari was granted, United States v. Hale, 419 U.S. 1045 (1974), because of conflict
among the courts of appeals over whether a defendant can be cross-examined about his
silence during police interrogation, and because of the importance of the question to the
administration of justice.
5. The Hale majority, not reaching the constitutional question, decided the case upon
evidentiary grounds. The holding, not being constitutionally mandated, is therefore not man-
datory on the various states, and is merely persuasive outside the federal courts. See Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
6. See, e.g., Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
878 (1973); United States v. Semensohn, 421 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v.
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permitted the introduction of defendant's prior silence.7
A number of the courts that proscribed bringing out defen-
dant's silence have based their holdings directly on the Miranda
dicta where the Court stated:
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize
an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when
he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may
not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed
his privilege in the face of accusation.'
While the United States Supreme Court had not previously
passed directly upon this issue, it had held in Harris v. New York9
that the prosecution's use of an accused's pre-Miranda-warning
statements for the limited purpose of impeachment is permissible.
The Court based that holding on its view that, although the defen-
dant must be protected against the state's attack on the basis of his
unconstitutionally elicited statements, the defendant does not have
a right to commit perjury and have his later inconsistent or fabri-
cated statements go to the jury without impeachment.'0 Thus
Miranda was viewed by Harris as a shield but not as a sword. As
mere silence provides no basis for an inference as to either the truth
or falsity of defendant's later testimony at trial, silence must clearly
come within the Miranda-shield reasoning rather than the Harris-
anti-sword exception.
Hale is probably more significant for what it does not say than
for what it does. Taken on its face, Hale would seem merely to
resolve a simple question of the law of evidence: Whether the silence
of an accused, who has been given his Miranda warnings, can be a
prior inconsistent statement so as to be used to impeach his credibil-
ity when and if he chooses to testify in his own behalf. Indeed, the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Marshall, opens the main
thrust of its reasoning by reviewing the law of evidence as to prior
inconsistent statements" and repostulates that silence gains proba-
tive value "only if it would have been natural under the circumstan-
Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969); Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969).
7. Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d
950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
8. 384 U.S. at 468 n.37 (emphasis added).
9. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
10. Id. at 225-26.
11. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1040 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
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ces to object to the assertion in question.""
In analyzing the probative value of an accused's silence, the
Court recognized the inherent distinction between the silence of one
in custodial interrogation as opposed to one who, in other circum-
stances, happens to be the hearer of an assertion which would nor-
mally call for a reply. The former is under no duty to speak and has
ordinarily been advised only moments earlier that he has the right
to remain silent and that anything he does say can and will be used
against him in court.
Under these circumstances, his failure to offer an explanation
during the custodial interrogation can as easily be taken to indi-
cate reliance on the right to remain silent as to support an infer-
ence that the explanatory testimony was a later fabrication.
There is simply nothing to indicate which interpretation is more
probably correct.":
On the other hand, if the prosecution is allowed to elicit the fact
of defendant's prior silence and to use this against him as if substan-
tive evidence of guilt, that silence will no doubt prejudice a defen-
dant in the eyes of the jury, impermissibly shifting the burden of
proof from the state to the defendant. Thus, the possible prejudice
far outweighs any imagined probative value.
The Court sought to support its position as "compelled"' 4 by
the decision in Grunewald v. United States. .There, the Court laid
out three factors to determine whether prior silence was inconsistent
with later exculpatory testimony. Those factors are: (1) repeated
assertions of innocence; (2) the secretive nature of the initial ques-
tioning; and (3) the focus on the accused as a potential defendant
at the time of arrest, making it "natural for him to fear that he was
being asked questions for the very purpose of providing evidence
12. 422 U.S. at 174. One is led to wonder if the assertion alluded to is any assertion at
all. The question which Hale refused to answer was: "Where did you get the money?" Surely
this question cannot raise an adoption of fact in the hearer. See 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note
11, at § 1042.
13. 422 U.S. at 177.
14. Id. at 175-76.
15. 353 U.S. 391 (1957). In Grunewald, again acting under the Court's supervisory power
rather than under any constitutional requirement, the Court stated that silence in the face
of grand jury accusation is not inconsistent with later testimony at trial. The defendant had
refused to answer grand jury questions on fifth amendment grounds and at trial the prosecu-
tor, for purposes of impeachment, elicited testimony concerning defendant's silence.
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against himself."'" The Hale majority reasoned that these factors,
as applied to Hale's silence, weighed even more heavily for exclu-
sion. The defendant had repeatedly and consistently asserted his
innocence; the forum in which defendant was questioned was secre-
tive, intimidating, and lacked even minimal safeguards;' 7 and de-
fendant had already been placed under arrest.
The government relied heavily on Raffel v. United States,"
where the Court held that the defendant's silence at his first trial
was inconsistent with his testimony at the second, and that the
former silence could be used to impeach the credibility of his later
representations. The government argued that since Hale chose to
testify in his own behalf at trial, it would be permissible under
Raffel to impeach his credibility by proving that he had chosen to
remain silent at the time of arrest. 9 The Hale Court rejected this
contention and distinguished Raffel on the basis that "[t]he as-
sumption of inconsistency underlying Raffel is absent here." ' "
Unfortunately, the Hale majority followed the evidentiary
problem of Grunewald and Justice Harlan's "more likely to remain
silent in secret proceedings" argument"' while side-stepping Raffel
and the constitutional question presented.2 Thus the Court left
open the question "whether the Raffel decision has survived" 3 and
whether defendant's silence may still be used against him under
certain circumstances. This was the very problem which caused
16. Id. at 422-23.
17. The Grunewald grand jury investigation was conducted in the presence of public
arbiters and a reporter, whereas Hale was questioned in secretive surroundings with no one
but the police present. 422 U.S. at 179.
18. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
19. 422 U.S. at 175.
20. Id.
21. "Innocent men are more likely to [remain silent] in secret proceedings
where they testify without advice of counsel and without opportunity for cross-
examination, than in open court proceedings where cross-examination and judi-
cally supervised procedures provide safeguards for the establishing of the whole,
as against the possibility of merely partial truth." 422 U.S. at 178 n.6, citing
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 291, 422-23 (1957).
22. The Court recognized the "constitutional overtones" presented by this line of cases,
422 U.S. at 180 n.7, but failed to reach the constitutional claim raised. Id. at 175 n.4.
23. Id. It should be noted that Hale does not explicitly overrule Raffel, which arguably
maintains its viability on its own facts.
24. See Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion to the effect that the Court rightly
avoided placing the decision on constitutional grounds, but criticizing the rebirth of the
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the conflict in the courts of appeals on which certiorari was
granted .
Justice Douglas and Justice White, however, squarely based
their concurring opinions on constitutional grounds, finding the case
to be controlled by Miranda. Justice Douglas reiterated Justice
Black's concurring opinion in Grunewald: "I can think of no special
circumstances that would justify use of a constitutional privilege to
discredit or convict a person who asserts it.""
Justice White, after a reminder that he is no more enthusiastic
about Miranda now than when that decision was first announced,27
noted however, that once accepting its existence, he, unlike the
majority, believes that due process prevents the prosecutor from
calling attention to the defendant's prior silence. "Surely Hale was
not informed here that his silence, as well as his words, could be
used against him at trial. Indeed, anyone would reasonably con-
clude from Miranda warnings that this would not be the case."2
Unless the Court is contemplating a significant withdrawal
from Miranda,2" allowing the prosecutor to comment, even in "spe-
cial circumstances," ' 0 on the defendant's silence has a direct and
impermissible impact on constitutional rights by affixing a penalty
to the assertion of the defendant's right to remain silent. In Griffin
v. California,"' the Court refused to allow comment on an accused's
failure to testify, on the basis that the decision of whether to speak
must be unfettered, and that therefore there can be no penalty
"generalized probability" of "likelihood of remaining silent." 422 U.S. at 181. See note 21
supra.
25. See footnotes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
26. 422 U.S. at 182, citing Grunewald v. United States 353 U.S. 391, 425 (1957) (Black,
J., concurring).
27. 422 U.S. at 182.
28. Id. at 183.
29. For cases limiting to some extent the scope of Miranda, see Michigan v. Mosely, 96
S. Ct. 321 (1975); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). A further withdrawal from Miranda may be
indicated in light of the retirement of Mr. Justice Douglas on November 12, 1975.
30. 422 U.S. at 177. The Court indicates that in other than "emotional and confusing
circumstances" use of defendant's silence may still be permissible. It is stressed that here,
Hale "could not have expected the police to release him merely on the strength of his explana-
tion." Id. at 179-80. The Court may be establishing a defendant's expectation of the necessity
to waive his rights as the test of special circumstances. This would be dangerously close to
eroding the ratio decidendi of Miranda.
31. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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imposed which would make the assertion of that privilege costly. 32
Permitting the use of an arrestee's silence under any circumstances
would lead to the anomaly of advising the arrestee that he has the
right to remain silent and, whether or not he gives up that right,
anything he says or fails to say can be used against him.33 It is this
very type of coercion, brought to bear by interrogating officials, that
the Miranda Court sought to prevent. "[T]o permit [even in spe-
cial circumstances] one's shielding of himself with his fifth amend-
ment right to be converted into a weapon against him drains the
right of much of its significance. '34 To allow such a cross-
examination would compel the defendant to sacrifice either his right
to remain silent prior to trial or his right to testify in his own de-
fense.3 1
The holding in Hale may unfortunately be taken by some in the
federal courts as a signal to look for any special circumstances 3
falling beyond the Grunewald factors. More dangerously, because
the decision is based only on evidentiary grounds, it may be taken
by those in the state court systems as an invitation to allow all such
cross-examination as being beyond the Court's supervisory powers.3 1
Absent the Court's directly addressing the constitutional questions,
the federal circuits remain split and the states remain free to inter-
pret the issue as they see fit.
FREDERICK C. SAKE
32. Id. at 614.
33. As early as McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1928), the Sixth Circuit
realized that if a defendant's prior silence is allowed to be used against him "the customary
formula of warning should be changed, and the respondent should be told, 'If you say any-
thing, it will be used against you; if you do not say anything, that will be used against you.'"
Id. at 299.
34. Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 53 (9th Cir. 1969).
35. Id. at 53-54.
36. See note 30 supra.
37. See note 5 supra.
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